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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume XIX WINTER 1969 Number 2
IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED OFFENSES AND THE
POLITICAL OFFENSES EXCEPTION IN EXTRADITION
-A PROPOSED JURIDICAL STANDARD
FOR AN UNRULY PROBLEM
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
INTRODUCTION
HE EXTRAORDINARY technological advances of the last two dec-
ades have not only put men on the moon, but have given all
men around the globe a greater sense of awareness of their
common universe. There is seldom an item of news transcending
local interest which is not available to the masses by the communica-
tions media of almost every country in the world. Considering that
it takes a fraction of a second to flash a given news item across the
globe and only hours to physically reach its extremities, there is a
growing realization that all peoples of this world are in some way
affected by their respective conduct.
A look at the events of the sixties augurs a new decade of rapid
changes and even more daring challenges to established beliefs,
values, structures and practices. The real significance of the atti-
tudinal change of the sixties lies in a fundamentally humanistic out-
*MR. BASSIOUNI is a Professor of law at DePaul University College of Law.
He received his A.B. from College of the Holy Family, LL.B. from Cairo Univer-
sity School of Law, J.D. from Indiana University School of Law, and LL.M. from
The Lawyer's Institute of John Marshall Law School. He is the author of CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: THE LAW OF PUBLIC ORDER (1969) as well as numerous
law review articles. Mr. Bassiouni is also a Fulbright-Hays Professor of inter-
national Criminal Law, and Visiting Professor of Law, at the University of Freiburg,
Germany.
look which has developed with respect to people's problems. The
emerging concern over "change" in this last decade and in the forth-
coming one is not so much concerned with its philosophy or its
motives as with the means used and the methods contemplated, re-
gardless of whether the "issue" is a limited social question or one
involving international implications. It is indeed very arduous to
deal with issues of legitimacy of change when confronted with the
radicalism of such concepts as "creative destruction" and "negative
oppression" which equally assume a premise of legitimacy.'
The development of the "war of liberation" which links the
guerrilla-type warring effort to an internal social program of revolu-
tionary change, has brought a new dimension to political activism,
whether in an "oppressed" or "free" nation. Consequently, it leaves
doubt about the significance and the extent of conduct deemed politi-
cal. The term "political offense" is hopelessly undefinable when the
laws are the product of an establishment against which a "war of
liberation" must be waged. The relatively easy distinction made be-
tween "common crimes" and "political crimes" during the early part
of this century is irrelevant in this decade. An era in which piracy
of the air, symbolic bombing of public and private buildings, and
the blatant rejection of almost all forms of public authority without
any apparent link between the actual conduct of the perpetrator
(what he is doing) and the aim sought to be achieved (the social or
political condition to be changed) requires immediate attention to
this unruly problem.
With respect to piracy of the air, otherwise referred to as "air-
craft hijacking,"2 article 11 of the 1963 Tokyo Convention (which
became effective December 4, 1969) rejects the notion that it should
be considered a political act receiving the benefit of the "political of-
fense" exception to extradition, and instead considers it an interna-
tional offense. The growing number of planes which are forcibly
1. See Stanmeyer, The New Left and the Old Law, 55 A.B.A.J. 319 (1969).
Mr. Stanmeyer also correctly questions the precision of the term "ideological
criminal," id. at 321 n.15. A more appropriate term is "ideologically motivated
offender," as used throughout this article.
2. Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 695
(1969). The words "aircraft piracy" are used in the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas, Art. 15 (1) (a) (b) (1962) 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200
450 U.N.T.S. 82. See also 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 657-59
(1963).
3. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
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derouted leaves us with the problem that if we consider the intent of
the abductor, a political characterization may be made and there will
be no extradition, but if we are to consider the actual conduct, the
crimes committed (kidnapping; theft of the plane and its goods;
theft of the services of the crew; and unauthorized usage of the
equipment) are of such a nature as to warrant extradition.
There have been in the last few years numerous incidents of air
piracy4 or forcible derouting of aircrafts (and countless unknown
attempts), but in only a few cases has extradition ever been sought.5
The United States, however, has never availed itself of this process
in such cases, even with Cuba to which most aircraft are derouted
and with which an extradition treaty is still in force.' The United
States has never even asked Switzerland, which represents the United
States in Havana, to present such a request in its behalf.
The issue with respect to most Havana bound "hijacking" is less
cumbersome than those issues involving "operations" by the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a group within the Palestine
Liberation Organization, which is definitely politically motivated,
craft, T.I.A.S. 6768 (Dec. 1969). See 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 569 (1964) and
Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture under the
Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REV. 509 (1967). Evans, supra note 2, at 708, reports
that the legal committee of ICAC, through its sub-committee on Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, took the view that such conduct could be characterized as "political." The
sub-committee's report may be found in 8 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 245 (1969).
See also 13 WORLD PEACE THOUGH LAW CENTER, CONVENTION TO DETER AIRCRAFT
HIJACKING (1969), which, however, does not go into the question of "political
offense" and probably intends the issue to be superseded by the obligation to "extra-
dite" what the proposed Convention labels an extraditable offense. The drafters
overlooked that making "hijacking" an extraditable offense does not ipso facto
eliminate the "political offense" exception which applies to extraditable offenses
even though asylum may not be at issue. See infra, notes 29-36, and corresponding
text.
4. See Evans, supra note 2, at 698.
5. Poland recently asked France to extradite two East Germans who derouted
a Polish plane to West Berlin. Le Monde, October 29, 1969, at 3. The French
authorities have denied extradition and the two escapees were convicted and sen-
tenced to two years in prison. France is deemed to have jurisdiction because the
aircraft landed in the French occupation zone of Berlin. In 1952, the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal denied extradition and granted asylum to Yugoslav citizens. In Re
Kaavic, Byelanovic and Assenijevic, 1952 Int. L. Rep. 371. On the other hand,
Cuba extradited a French citizen, Albert Cardon, to Mexico where he was tried
and sentenced for forcefully derouting an aircraft (Pan-Am flight from Houston to
Panama) after it had taken off from Mexico City en route to Guatemala City. The
Cardon case was reported by the N.Y. Times, August 10, 1961, at 4, col. 1; Au-
gust 15, at 11, col. I (late city ed.).
6. See Extradition Treaty with Cuba, 33 Stat. 2265 (1905).
but whose objectives are sometimes non-military targets. Whenever
such "operations" are directed at Israeli interests outside Israel, or
for that matter extend against Zionist interests outside Israel, and the
object or target has no apparent military connection, can their mem-
bers claim that their conduct is "political" even though it involves
the commission of a common crime?7 As the relationship between
the crime committed and the social or political aim sought to be
achieved is only remotely linked by the designs of the perpetrator
and its proportionality fails to meet the test of logic or reason, should
the political characterization still extend? Too often it will depend
solely on politically oriented national interpretations and not on any
sound juridical basis. Even in the countries where such a juridical
inquiry is made, it is not the expression of an internationally recog-
nized standard, as none has yet been accepted by the international
community.
What is a political crime and how it will be evaluated in ex-
tradition proceedings is a question of serious importance for the
preservation and maintenance of world public order. It is also
necessary to show how the decision is reached in order to avoid
abusive practices which may emerge to meet those new needs and
which may unduly deprive the relator of minimum standards of due
process of law. That the political offender becomes a hero if he
succeeds and a criminal if he fails is almost a truism in today's politi-
cally divided world. It is a poor substitute, however, for a juridical
standard and a sad commentary on the persisting state of international
relations.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF EXTRADITION AS AN
INTERNATIONAL PROCESS
International law in the twentieth century is entering a pronounced
phase of changing structures which entail the broadening of its
scope and application. The individual who had been alien to the
scope of this discipline is acquiring a limited place therein. This is
manifested by the recognition and proclamation of certain funda-
mental human rights and by the subjection of the individual to
7. See TIME, January 5, 1970, at 27, col. 3 and 28, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 1,
1968, at 16, col. 6; N.Y. Times, August 30, 1969, at 1, col. 8; Evans, supra note 2,
at 698 n.14.
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personal accountability before the world community. Relations be-
tween nation-states are ceasing to be a matter of limited interest and
exclusive concern of the parties immediately involved, but are broad-
ening to encompass some aspect of the world community's interests
in the maintenance and preservation of world public order.' The
impact of these factors on classical norms of extradition law and
practice are causing a reevaluation of this institution's purposes and
functions,' and, consequently, affecting the nature and application
of the political offense exception thereto.
The classical definition of extradition refers to it as the process
by which one state (the state of refuge or asylum) surrenders to
another (the requesting state) an individual (the relator) accused
or convicted in the requesting state of an offense for which the re-
8. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1960) and McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960). For a different
approach, see Carlston, World Order and International Law, 20 J. Lwr.AL ED. 127
(1967).
For the purposes of this paper, the following terms are defined thusly:
IDEOLOGY: Body of doctrine or thought based on values supporting a social or
political movement, institution or class.
VALUES: The ideals to which a measure of regard, significance and importance
is subjectively ascribed to by one who estimates the worth and quality of the said
ideals.
VALUE-JUDGMENT: A preference, choice of a form of action or thought over
another without a fixed evaluation but in reliance upon ideology and values.
IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED OFFENDER: One who knowingly commits a
violation of positive law, with the belief that it is warranted or justified by a
higher order or superior values than those ascribed to the law which he violates. A
person moved by ideology who has made a value-judgment that for him justifies
such conduct.
AUTHORITATIVE PROCESS: A system by virtue of which there is power and
ability to direct the actions of others in a desired manner without reasoned persua-
sion or choice.
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: A system through which persons at varying
levels, holding authority (ability to direct others) coordinate and produce a final
result.
ORDER: The product of a system of action and interaction, having a value-
oriented goal for the purpose of a value realization.
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: Is "order" oriented to that which affects mankind
and is brought into being by the collective action and interaction of all constitutive
forces of the various world authoritative decision-making processes.
9. See BASSIOUNI, International Extradition and World Public Order: A Con-
ceptual Evaluation, in Aktuelle Probleme Der Internationalen Strafrecht, (Oehler and
Potz eds. 1970); Bassiouni, Rapporto di sintezi, in PRE-CONGRESSO Di DmRTTo
PENALE INTERNAZIONALE DI SIRACUSA (Siracusano ed. 1969); and Wise, Some
Problems of Extradition, 3-4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 518 (1968),
reprinted in 15 WAYNE L. REV. 709 (1968).
questing state is seeking to subject the relator to trial or punishment.10
A proposed conceptual framework for extradition according to
this author should be based on five interlocking factors, which are:
(1) the recognition of the "national interest" of the states who are
parties to the extradition proceedings; (2) the existence of an inter-
national duty to preserve and maintain world public order; (3) the
effective application of minimum standards of fairness and justice to
the relator in the extradition process; (4) a collective duty on the
part of all states to combat criminality; and (5) the balancing of
these factors within the juridical framework of the "Rule of Law."'1
The interrelationship of these five factors is based on the following
rationale: (1) The existence of a duty to preserve and maintain
world public order does not destroy national sovereignty. The in-
terests of the world community can be considered within the scope
of the "national interest" because this latter concept is founded on
the notion that "national independence [is better served] within in-
ternational interdependence."' 2  (2) The enforcement of individual
rights in extradition proceedings is not only a matter of humanitarian
concern, but also a recognition that the individual is a party in interest
vis-a-vis the respective states and the world community. Such rec-
ognition does not detract from a nation's sovereignty if for no other
reason than that the individual is ultimately the bearer of the conse-
quences of institutionalized conflicts and personally accountable be-
fore the world community for acts in violation of international law.
10. See Bassiouni, International Extradition in the American Practice and World
Public, 36 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1968); Bassiouni, International Extradition: An
American Experience and a Proposed Formula, 3-4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PENAL 494 (1968), reprinted in 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733 (1969); Bassiouni, La Estra-
dizione Internazionale: Riassunto della Prassi Americana Contemporanea, ed. uno
schema di porposte per il sinnovanmente dell'istituto, 10 RIVISTA DEL DIRITTO
MATRIMONIALE E DELLO STATO DELLE PERSONE 418 (1968). A generally recognized
definition which was proposed to the Freiburg International Colloquium on Ex-
tradition is to be found in 1-2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL at 362
(1966). For the Proceedings of the Freiburg Colloquium see 3-4 REVUE INTERNA-
TIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 819 (1968). The definition accepted in America was stated
in Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, at 289 (1902).
11. For the principal aut dedere aut punire, see Bassiouni, 36 TENN. L. REV. supra
note 10, at 27. On an individual's rights, see Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and
International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L.J. 525 (1964); KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS
CORPUS (1962); SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
(1964); and DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS (1951).
12. Bassiouni, 36 TENN. L. REv. supra note 10, at 4. See ROUSSEAU, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1953); VATTEL's LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAW (Scott ed. 1964).
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(3) Mutual cooperation and assistance in penal matters reinforces
the effectiveness of the municipal public order of all states and does
not have to depend for its effectiveness on political compromises or
denial of individual rights. (4) Adherence to the "Rule of Law"
is the ultimate safeguard and guarantee for the survival of mankind.
Such a framework lends credence to the merits of the process through
which decisions are reached. Credibility in the process makes ac-
ceptance of its results more likely and thus greatly diminishes op-
portunities for conflict over the decisional outcome.
In our contemporary, politically factionalized world, it would be
naive to believe that in balancing these five factors in this proposed
concept of extradition all said factors are equal; some are "more
equal" than others. The first of these factors, the nationally per-
ceived interest of the state, will remain the foremost consideration.
The second factor, concern for world public order, will be largely
shaped by considerations ancillary to the first and, therefore, of lesser
impact in the course of the authoritative decision-making process
leading to the granting or denial of extradition. The third, concern
for the individual, will remain the least considered factor in the over-
all balancing of the equities and interests involved, as weighted by
today's politically value-oriented decisions of institutional authorita-
tive processes.'3 The fourth, if it is ever considered, will be regarded
as part of "national interest" and not as an international obligation
arising under general principles of international law. With respect
to the "Rule of Law" concept, it will most likely be received perfunc-
torily and given lip service adherence by the following of certain
forms and formalities with little or no regard for its substance.
Somehow, even this bleak picture may become encouraging if a break-
through is accomplished through greater adherence to the "Rule of
Law" when we consider that in the history of law, forms, formalities
and essentially adjective law determined outcomes which shaped
some of the most fundamental and substantive human rights.
EXTRADITION AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14
Extradition is regarded throughout the world, with some variations
13. See McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process ot Au-
thoritative Decisions, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253 (1967).
14. See, e.g. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d rev. ed. Tucker
1969] 223
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in application but not in substance, as an institutional practice.
Governments are the subjects of its regulation, while individuals are
the objects of its outcome. The individual who is contemplated by
extradition proceedings is not the primary party contemplated by
extradition law and practice. Restrictions, limitations, or defenses
which exist under extradition law are not, with a few exceptions,
primarily designed for the benefit of the individual, but rather for the
benefit of the states involved. While it is sustainable to argue that
the individual is the beneficiary of the political exception to extradi-
tion, the fact that his right thereto is limited to the raising of the issue
is indicative of the real center of interest.' The state of refuge has
the sole discretion of recognizing or rejecting the relator's contention
that his alleged conduct falls within the scope of the political offense
exception to extradition, but it does so in accordance with its own
self-serving standards. 16
1966); 20'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); Tucker, Has the Individual Be-
come the Subject of International Law?, 34 U. CINc. L. REV. 341, 358 (1965),
wherein he states: "As a result of the Charter of the United Nations-as well as
of other changes in international law-the individual has acquired a status and
stature which have transformed him from an object of international compassion to
a subject of international right;" Korowicz, The Problem of the International Per-
sonality of Individuals, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 533 (1956); Lauterpacht, The Subjects
of the Law of Nations, 63 LAW Q. REV. 438 (1947) and 64 LAW Q. REV. 97 (1948);
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE (1945); Jessup, The Subjects of a
Modern Law of Nations, 45 MICH. L. REV. 383 (1947); Eagleton, Some Questions
as to the Place of the Individual in the International Law of the Future, 37 AM.
J. INT'L L. 642 (1943); WILLIAMS, ASPECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-88
(1939); JENCKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND 58 (1958). BRIERLY, THE
BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958), states: "We may, assume that
by international law we mean the body of principles which regulates the conduct of
states in their relations with one another." Id. at 2. Cf. SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT
DES GENS Pt. I (1932); GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC(1953); and Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (1947). Also compare
JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1-3 (1956), with CORBETT, THE STUDY OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 50 (1955); CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF
STATES 10, 12 and 19 (1951); and with BISHOP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1962). See also, NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS (rev. ed. 1954).
15. See Bassiouni, 36 TENN. L. REV., supra note 10, at 16-19.
16. See Evans, Reflections upon the Political Offenses in International Prac-
tice, 57.AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1963); Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958);
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cit. 1957); Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211
F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954); Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245'(S.D. Cal. 1956);
Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See also TIME, March 15,
1968, at 27, for the account of the Czechoslovakian General Jan Sejna who de-
fected to the United States after Dubcek's coup; and the N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1967,
at 4, col. 4 for the case of Calvin C. Cobb, an American Negro who sought refuge
in Tanzania and successfully fought his extradition on social-political grounds. The
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To further emphasize the interstate nature of the concept of ex-
tradition, nowhere in extradition law and practice can the individ-
ual-the object of the proceedings-compel the demanding state or
the state of refuge to adhere to internationally recognized principles
of extradition law if the states wish not to recognize them or to circum-
vent or waive their application. 17  Many states, in fact, deny that
asylum or extradition are subject-matters which fall within general
principles of international law and, hence, that no international obli-
gation exists other than the specific duties created by treaty or
accepted through reciprocal practice. It must be noted, however,
that "customs evidenced by the practice of nations" are one of the
sources of international law and are, therefore, as binding upon
those nations as are their treaty obligations. One can advance the
proposition that treaties of extradition and practiced customs in ex-
tradition have developed certain principles which fall within "general
principles of international law,"' 8 and thus create binding obliga-
tions upon the nation-states to adhere to such principles. There is,
however, no direct right conferred upon the individual by interna-
tional extradition law which he can claim, let alone enforce, against
either of the respective states involved; he is always dependent upon
their good faith and benevolence.' 9 The application and enforce-
defense was rejected in the cases of Jimenez v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914, rehearing
denied, 379 U.S. 858 (1963); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 314 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963);
Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962).
17. See O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, (1960) 36 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 279 and infra notes 44-47.
18. Freidmann, The Use of "General Principles" in the Development of Inter-
national Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279 (1963).
19. The only exception is under the European Court of Human Rights and
the Commission on Human Rights which hears individual petitions and gives in-
dividuals standing to present claims against states. The European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was signed at Rome,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 and became effective September 3, 1953. Fifteen
members of the Council of Europe ratified the Convention: Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. France and Swit-
zerland have not yet ratified it. See,. e.g., WEIL, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (1963); ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE; and STEIN & HAY,
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIc AREA (1967). Rene Cassin, 1969 Nobel
Peace Prize Winner and architect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Civil and Political Rights Covenant, founded, in 1969, a Human Rights Center
in Strasbourg, France, to study the implementation of human rights. The Center's
Secretary-General, Dr. K. Vasak, has been a main force in this direction within
the Council of Europe. Also, Luis Kutner's efforts for the creation of a "World
Habeas Corpus" should be noted. See Kutner, 41 U. DET. L.J. 525, supra note 11;
and KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS (1962).
ment of individual rights is considered a matter of municipal law
even though it might involve certain aspects of human rights recog-
nized and proclaimed by the world community. This problem arises
from the fact that the individual is still not considered a "subject"
of international law and, hence, no practical means for the imple-
mentation of his rights have been developed which would allow him
to seek redress of wrongs against a given state shielded by the "Doc-
trine of Sovereignty."2  Mutual failure by the respective states to
follow their own treaty or other legal obligations will not even create
a right under international law that the individual can raise against
those states, except whenever municipal law allows him a specific
right, the denial of which, however, will continue to be an internal
matter. A mutual or consentual failure by the respective states to
extradition proceedings to abide by a treaty obligation designed to
inure to the relator's benefit may not even constitute a breach thereof,
since the individual who bears its consequences is not a party to the
treaty. However, lack of fairness or good faith by the parties in the
application of rights which they have stipulated in favor of third
parties, or conceded to individuals as parties beneficiary under the
treaty, may be said to violate the principle of Ex Acquo et Bono,
at least in this century, even though traditionalist scholars would
oppose this conclusion.
Treaty rights created by the respective nation-states which contain
a stipulation for the benefit of "the individual," are, to that extent,
rights running in favor of the third party, even though "the individ-
ual" is neither a party to the treaty nor a fully recognized subject of
international law.2' A claim could be asserted that a state's failure
20. See European Convention, supra note 19.
21. On the subject of treaty rights and interpretation of treaties, see McDOUGAL,
LASSWELL AND CHENG, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER AND TREATY INTERPRETATION (1968).
Professor Dehaussy of the University of Paris feels that individuals can claim
"their" rights from "their" states through the principle of invoking the binding
obligations and laws of the state against the state itself. See 1 JURIS-CLASSEUR
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL chs. 10 and 14 (1958). The basis for this principle of the
common law, which subjects its parties to the duty of good faith, is found in 3
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 163. For its recognition and application in inter-
national law, see 1 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1963). A
corollary to that principle is the theory of abus de droit, or abuse of right,
which is recognized in international law and prohibits states who are required
and presumed to act in "good faith" from abusing their "rights." See, e.g., BIN-
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED By INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS (1953).
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to grant the relator those rights created for his benefit by treaty, or by
general principles of international law regarding extradition, create
implications of illegality, in addition to which in certain cases a moral
stigma would attach to that nation. To eliminate opportunities for
any possible loss of political face which could be used by other states
not parties to the proceedings or by the states involved in the issue,
most "rights" conferred upon or granted "the individual" in most ex-
tradition treaties are couched in terms which are vague and indefi-
nite so as to insure against the certainty of their claim and assertion.
This is particularly true in the provisions relating to the "political
offense exception."22
This article will propose a set of juridical standards which would
grant the individual the privilege of claiming a right to the defense
of "political offense" as an exception to extradition with some meas-
ure of juridical certainty of enforcement under municipal law and
international law. Such a right would only compel the nation-states
involved to follow juridically defined standards under sanction of in-
ternational law. This would inure to the benefit of both the relator
and the respective states by shielding them from criticism, and, at
the same time, it reduces chances for disruptions of world public
order.
THE IDEOLOGICAL AND VALUE-ORIENTED CONTENT OF OFFENSES
AND THE IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED OFFENDER
From earliest recorded history, societies-regardless of their in-
stitutional form-have sought to protect their structures against
enemies from within, as well as against those from without. Social
institutions and political structures are said to express the collectivity's
goals and values. Since some individuals differ in goals and values
from those expressed by such social institutions and political struc-
tures, they may become enemies from within by translating their
divergent views into certain forms of activism. Recorded history
frequently indicates mere divergence of thought has been considered
dangerous and destructive enough to warrant suppression.
22. In order not to detract from the reader's continuity, a thorough examina-
tion of political offense clauses in American treaties may be found in Appendix A
of this paper. See Evans, The New Extradition Treaties of the United States, 59
AM. J. INT'L L. 351 (1965).
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To secure their institutions, societies have devised laws designed
to punish those who in some proscribed manner seek to affect their
existence or functions. Those laws may be designed to prevent
change altogether or to prevent change by certain means. The fact
that these laws were enacted to protect a given social interest pre-
supposes that a value-judgment was made as to the social significance
of what is sought to be preserved and protected. Paradoxically, the
violators of these laws are committed to changing the protected
status quo and thereby do not consider their conduct blameworthy;
if anything, almost always the converse is true. In fact, the ideologi-
cally motivated offender is one who denies the legitimacy of the
law he violates and claims adherence to a superior legitimating
principle.
Laws are the product of basic human drives and embody the values
which are manifested by these drives. 23  The enactment of laws
designed to secure political and social institutions is predicated on
the values ascribed to the preservation and maintenance of these
very structures. This presupposes the balancing of two value-rated,
coexisting factors: (1) a social interest sought to be preserved;
and (2) a social harm sought to be prevented. The use of legal
sanctions to achieve these ends assumes that those it will seek to deter
share to some extent the values embodied in that which is sought to
be preserved. If such is not the case, as it may well not be, then
vengeance and not deterrence becomes the object of the legal sanc-
tion-and so the harshest penalties are often enacted which express
the conviction that there is little or no redeeming value in the of-
fender; hence, death for treason has been the almost universal penalty,
except where the penalty itself has been abolished.24
The relationship between the assumption that laws embody ac-
cepted values and the actual values of a society at a given time is a
relative one. It is a relationship which is also contingent upon the
flexibility and evolutionary characteristics of the very laws which
are assumed to embody these values. The more static the laws re-
main while values undergo change, the more contingent that relation-
23. See DAvrTr, The Basic Values in Law, TRANS. AM. PHIL. Soc. Part 5 (1968).
-24. See BASSIOUNi, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: THE LAW OF PUBLIC
ORDER (1969); PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (1968); HART, PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); and HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW (1947).
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ship becomes and the less relevant will these laws be to the common
morality embodied in the ordinary reasonable man concept. This
concept of common morality is the foundation of self-regulation and
social blameworthiness without which no laws could be effectively
upheld and enforced by any organized society. The more repressive
the society, the less significant this aspect of self-regulating common
morality will appear to be. Conversely, the more liberal the society,
the more it will have to depend for its ordered survival upon this con-
cept.
Somehow through the history of mankind certain forms of human
behavior have emerged which have invariably been characterized as
offensive to the common morality of man. Hence, "common crimes"
are those forms of behavior which affect an interest commonly and
generally regarded by organized societies as violative of the accepted
values of man, irrespective of political ideology or social structure
Murder is the most obvious example.
Beyond those commonly accepted values, other enacted legal man-
dates are predicated on a value-judgment reached by virtue of an
ideologically oriented framework of values which do not enjoy that
same common recognition. The context and meaning of such laws
will therefore vary in time and place, and no uniform or permanent
significance can be ascribed to them.
The "positivist doctrine of law" would see no basis for distinction
as between violations of the law.25 Yet, notwithstanding this posi-
tion, the utilitarian basis of penal law would be seriously hampered
because the motivating factor of the offender is the very ideological
value sought to be preserved by the offense. The ideologically mo-
tivated offender is, therefore, one who (theoretically) cannot be de-
terred by the legal mandate he is transgressing.26 This argument at
least favors considering a qualitative distinction as to categories of
violations of legal mandates.
An ideologically motivated offense is conduct actuated by values
which are in conflict with those values represented by the law that
is being violated. In fact, the violation proper becomes incidental
to the competing and struggling ideological values. This meaning
of the ideologically motivated offense encompasses, therefore, politi-
25. HART, supra note 24.
26. BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 11-38.
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cal offenses stricto senso and is broader in scope and meaning than
the latter because it is not limited to conduct directed solely against
political institutions, but extends to social structures and their func-
tions as well.
Even if one is to limit the inquiry to violations bearing directly
upon strictly political institutions, excluding their supporting social
structures, the inquiry into the values of the offender and those which
were affected by his conduct is unavoidable. In this case, no degree
of juridical certainty can be established since the only factor appearing
herein is purely subjective. The attempt to find some standard of
proportionality between the subjective goals and values of the perpe-
trator, that which he seeks to accomplish and the means used, only
adds confusion to an already unruly problem. There is hardly a
valid method of legal inquiry that can be predicated on such a sui
generis standard. A subjective evaluation can only be made after an
objective foundation is laid, and not vice versa, otherwise, it is no
longer a "Rule of Law" that is formulated, but an ad hoc ruling of
the individual judge, which destroys the certainty of the law."
Ideologically value-oriented legal mandates, whose significance
by their very nature fluctuate in time and are relative to a given
societal framework, cannot rise to international significance. The
only basis for such recognition is when the proscribed conduct is
sanctioned by the common morality of mankind, as in the case of
"international crimes" discussed below.28 Only when a common
level of values has permeated all peoples of the world can a truly in-
ternational standard be applied in the case of such inquiries. In the
absence of a common level of values, and with respect to such laws
which have not reached this level, the only substitute is a uniform
juridical standard offering judicial inquiry such as the one proposed
below. This conclusion is inescapable if it is conceded that every
ideologically motivated offense is an attack upon the law, but not
every attack upon the law is to benefit from the characterization of
"political offense" as an exception to extradition.
27. For the principle nulla poena sine legge and certainty in penal laws, see
BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 39-43.
28. See DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DU DROIT PENAL
INTERNATIONAL (1928) and DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES DU
DRorr PENAL INTERNATIONAL (1938).
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED
OFFENDER, ASYLUM, AND DENIAL OF EXTRADITION ON
"POLITICAL OFFENSE" GROUNDS 2 9
The ideologically motivated offender is one who strikes a blow to
the most vital part of the requesting state's structure. The object of
his conduct is the power structure complex, its institutional functions,
and sometimes the very existence of the state. The offender's most
likely refuge will be in that state which has the most interest in the
outcome of that type of conduct. In fact, the offender is not likely
to seek refuge in a state which, by reason of identical or similar
political ideology or form of government, is likely to feel vicariously
aggrieved by his conduct. In reality, the choice of a state of refuge
made by the political offender will not be determined by the merits
of his conduct, but by his evaluation of the political relations existing
between the state wherein he committed his offense and the state
wherein he would seek refuge. 0
As asylum is granted, extradition is denied, even though the con-
verse is not necessarily true. More often than not the decision to
29. For a comparative evaluation and explanation of several national policies
and laws, see Schultz, General Report on Question IV for 10th Int'l Law Penal
Congress 3-4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL, supra note 10, at 785.
For the relationship between the law of asylum, the political offense exception, and
the penal policy of some foreign countries, see RONNING, DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM, LEGAL
NORMS AND POLITICAL REALITY IN LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS (1965); Rousseau,
Preface to KOZIEBRODZKI, LE DROIT D'ASILE (1962); VIEIRA, DERECHO DE AslO
DIPLOMATICO (AsILO POLITICO). MONTEVIDEO, BIBLIOTECA DE PUBLICACIONES
OFICIALES DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO CIENCIAS SOCIALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE LA
REPUBLICA (1961); LA FOREST, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA (1961);
KIRCHEIMER, GEGENWARTSPROBLEME DER ASYLEGEWAHRUNO (1959); GRiiTZNER,
STAATSPOLITIK UND KRIMINAL-POLITIK IN AUSLIEFERNGSRECHT ZIETSHRIFT FUR DIE
GESAUTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSHAFT, Tome 68 (1956); GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT (1956); GREENBURGH, Recent Developments
in the Law of Diplomatic Asylum, 41 TRANS. GROTIUS Soc. 103 (1955); PAPA-
THANASSiOU, L'EXTRADITION EN MATIERE POLITIQUE (1954); PLANAs-SuAREZ, EL
ASILO DIPLOMATICO. ESTUDIO JURIDICO Y POLITICO SOBRE ESTE EXECRABLE USO
LATINOAMERICANO DESTRUCTOR DE LA SOBERANIA NACIONAL Y DE LA CORDIALIDAD
INTERNACIONAL (1953); QUINTANA, DERECHO DE ASILO (1952); Morgenstern, Diplo-
matic Asylum, 67 LAW Q. REV. 362 (1951); AFRICA, POLITICAL OFFENSES IN
EXTRADITION (1927); Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, [1949] 26 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 327; Morgenstern, Extraterritorial Asylum, [1958] 25 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 236; PIGGOTT, EXTRADITION, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO FUGI-
TIVE OFFENDERS (1910); Green, Recent Practice in the Law of Extradition, 6
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 287 (1953); Hambro, New Trends in the Law of Extra-
dition and Asylum, 5 WEST. POL. Q. 11 (1952); McNair, Extradition and Extra-
territorial Asylum, [1951) 28 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172.
30. See supra note 16 and note 29.
grant or deny extradition will have little to do with what the relator
did or why he did it, but, in keeping with the classical concept of
extradition, will depend on the political interest and convenience of
the respective states. Thus, the national interest will become almost
the exclusive consideration, disregarding any concern for the effect of
the decision to grant or deny extradition on the maintenance and
preservation of world public order and without regard for the individ-
ual's human rights or concern for his prosecution or punishment."'
An examination of the practice of asylum clearly reveals that the
ideological and political proximity of the respective states is directly
proportional to the likelihood that asylum will be denied. The more
opposed they are ideologically and politically, the more likely the
fugitive will find refuge or asylum therein.
It must be noted that a political offender is more intensely wanted
by the state he has attacked than a common criminal whose wrong
was not directed against the institutional existence or its structure
and, therefore, it is less likely he will be fairly treated.
The basis traditionally advanced for granting asylum and denying
extradition is concern for the individual. The theory of humane
concern is predicated on two factors: (1) altruistic humanitarian
considerations relating to the treatment to which the relator may be
subjected upon his return; 2 and (2) a commitment in principle by
the asylum state to the values of individual freedom. Both factors,
while defensible in principle, must be labelled for what they are-
value judgments by one political entity predicated on a political
ideology deemed superior to that of another equally sovereign po-
litical entity. As stated by one authority:
Those who have fled religious, racial or political persecution and who may be
31. See supra note 11.
32. It is significant to note that the rule of "noninquiry" prohibits the state of
refuge from inquiring into the process of the requesting state as a consideration or
factor in determining the extraditability of the offender. The United States ad-
heres to this rule except when it relates to "political offenses." This is a trouble-
some question; if the American concern is truly humanitarian, it should be uni-
formly applied and not dependent upon the nature of the offense. See Bassiouni,
36 TENN. L. REV., supra note 10, at 21-25, and the cases cited, infra notes 79-85.
It must further be noted that a doctrine of "specialty" exists which prohibits the
requesting state from prosecuting the relator for any other offense than that for
which he was extradited. All American treaties except those with Hungary and
Ecuador have such a proviso. While such a doctrine inures to the benefit of the
relator, it originated as a question of sovereignty. See Bassiouni, 36 TENN. L. REV.,
supra note 10, at 15-16.
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described as political refugees ... have found territorial asylum in the United
States, not by right, for the United States does not recognize or subscribe to as a
part of international law the so-called Doctrine of Asylum, but by grant of the gov-
ernment for humanitarian reasons, in recognition of the obligation of a free people
toward the politically oppressed or for consideration of foreign policy.3 3
It is noteworthy that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
recognizes a right to asylum for non-political crimes. 34  This arises
from a concern for refugees and stateless persons. Although it con-
siders asylum for political crimes a commendable practice to be en-
couraged, it has not clearly made such asylum part of its recognized
principles. However, political asylum for crimes of "thought" or
crimes of "being" or for political persecution predicated on race,
color, religion, or national origin does fall within the category of
asylum by right enunciated by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.35  Such is not the case for politically motivated
crimes wherein the actor engages in some material conduct deemed
violative of the laws of a given state. Hence, it will be necessary to
distinguish situations so as to ascertain whether or not a right of
asylum exists under international law and also whether the conduct
of the relator falls within the treaty definition of a "political offense"
exception to extradition, which would enable him to raise the ques-
tion under the municipal laws of that state.
The first distinction to be made is between asylum in the sense
of permission by one state to an individual to enter its territory or
remain therein when such individual is not sought by another state,
which involves only two parties, and asylum in the sense of allowing
a person sought by a state to be shielded from its processes by a denial
of extradition, s6 which involves three parties. Next, the granting of
33. Evans, supra note 16, at 18. See Evans, Observations of the Practice of
Territorial Asylum in the United States, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 148 (1962); Garcia-
Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and
Asylum, 14 U. Pirr. L. REV. 371 (1953); and Deere, Political Offenses in the Law
and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1933).
34. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948); Article 14 of the Declaration in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949);
Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [1948] Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 354; Kunz, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 43 AM. J.
INT'L L. 316 (1949).
35. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at # 7g 6N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). For
a discussion of "status criminality" in American criminal law, see BASSIOUNI,
supra note 24, at 138-57.
36. See supra note 33.
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asylum must be distinguished from the decision to refuse extradi-
tion. The state of refuge will decide the issue of extradition irre-
spective of and separate from the issue of allowing the relator to re-
main on its territory. The issue of extradition is decided on the
basis of the treaty binding the two states or, in the absence of a
treaty, on their customary reciprocal relations. The issue of asylum
is considered a question of internal law, for it is deemed an immi-
gration matter which is beyond the scope of the extradition question
which may arise under international law.
In denying extradition, a state claims that the offense for which
the relator is sought is not within the offenses specified in the treaty,
or that it falls within the exception thereto; therefore, no obligation
exists to exercise its jurisdictional power over the person of the relator
and deliver him to the requesting state. Whether the state of refuge is
concerned with the fate of the offender, desirous of upholding a
national commitment to certain ideals and values, or simply further-
ing its own self-serving political interests, the consequence is that
the relator will be shielded from the processes of the requesting state,
and he will evade the consequences of his conduct altogether. Thus,
to be concerned with the rights of the relator is tantamount to grant-
ing him impunity, which is to the detriment of at least two of the
five factors outlined above: (1) world public order, by disruption
of the political relations between the respective states; and (2) the
duty to combat criminality, by lack of concern for the prosecution
or punishability of a potential offender. Whether or not the state
of refuge, in addition to denying extradition, will also grant asylum
will be an internal decision based on national considerations.
The arguments offered in favor of granting asylum are usually
humanitarian or strictly political. Both are, however, affected by
two considerations: (1) a balancing of the extent to which granting
asylum will affect political relations with the state whose extradition
request was denied, the political worth of the refugee, and the degree
of national commitment to the values involved in the refugee's con-
duct; and (2) the extent to which the refugee will present a domestic
problem to municipal public order. While the first consideration is
purely political and can only be subject to speculation, the second can
be evaluated in the following manner: Assuming that the criminality
of the refugee (political offender) is predicated and dependent upon
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certain ideological conditions which brought about his violative con-
duct, then the removal of these conditions, or his removal from their
environment, eliminates the basis of his criminality. In the absence
of any other factors indicating a propensity to criminality, and if the
political offender abstains from political activities against the nation
from whose processes he was shielded, he will not represent a greater
threat to the municipal public order of the asylum state than any other
individual. This line of argument is further used to rationalize that
denial of extradition for such an offender is not in derogation of the
theory of mutual assistance and cooperation in combatting crimi-
nality, because the refugee does not fall within the contemplated
category of common criminals for whom there is an international
reciprocal interest in bringing to prosecution and punishment.
THE IDEOLOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED OFFENDER, THE
MORE WANTED OFFENDER, AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
The decision to seek extradition of a fugitive is arrived at by the
executive, authoritative decision-makers of the requesting state. The
decision to recognize or reject the requesting state's petition, either for
political reasons or genuine juridical ones, lies with the executive,
authoritative decision-maker's process of the state of refuge even
though a judicial intervention may occur in the interim.3 7 It is thus
apparent that political collisions are likely, since the opposing parties
are two distinct, executive, authoritative decision-making processes
which are pitted without recourse against each other.
The manner in which extradition is denied or asylum granted can
create a threat to world public order. Suppose that the relator's con-
duct was directed against the state itself, and that the state, whose
authority, integrity, and indeed very "identity" may have been seri-
ously threatened, is now being denied the right to bring the offender
to trial. Any state is understandably concerned about the control
of common crime within its borders, but the intensity of its concern
is greater in those situations where the foundation of its internal
political order has been shaken. Particularly in the case of espionage,
the future security of the state may well be dangerously threatened.
Diplomatic relations will undoubtedly be strained to the limit where
37. For different modus operandi, see 3-4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PENAL, supra note 10.
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the offender has stolen plans or other secrets vital to the security and
integrity of the demanding state. If the asylum state was also one
of the instigators or beneficiaries of the illicit information-gathering
activity of the fugitive, the result may be most threatening to the
peaceful relations of the respective nations, and consequently, to
world public order.
The internal political control of the demanding state may become
an issue wherever a dictatorial faction is in power, since the failure
to promptly apprehend and swiftly punish the offender may en-
courage other dissidents to acts of sabotage and revolt. The very
power of the ruling class would be threatened by allowing the political
offender to remain safely within the protection of the asylum state
and would represent a moral challenge to the power structure of the
demanding state.
Could such loss of face force a demanding state to threats or acts
of aggression against the asylum state? It is not likely, of course,
but the fact remains that the "political offense" exception to extradi-
tion may lead to a disruption of world public order because the con-
tentious states are left with no other alternative to their exclusive,
opposing, decision-making processes. No procedure exists which
would remove the case from the contentious parties to an independ-
ent, international, adjudicatory process. Not even an internationally
recognized standard of inquiry exists which would lend credence to the
process of extradition, be it in its administrative or judicial phase, and
which would result in the granting of asylum or denial of extradition.
Since World War II, the immigration laws of many states have
been revised to provide for asylum of political refugees.88 This has
been done in the interest of protecting individuals from persecution in
38. See Evans, The Political Refugee in United States' Law and Practice, 3 INT'L
LAw. 205 (1969); Evans, 56 AM. J. INT'L L., supra note 33; De Vries and Novas,
Territorial Asylum in the Americas-Latin American Law and Practice of Extradi-
dition, 5 INTER-AMERICAN L. REv. 61 (1963). Section 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1965), provides that the political
refugee who has been admitted into the country and is then found to be a deportable
alien may request a temporary withholding of deportation on the plea that he would
be subjected to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion in the
country to which he is to be deported. Section 203(a)(7) added to the Act in
1965, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1965), provides for conditional entry of political refugees.
The refugee is considered to be an excludable alien whose status can be adjusted
to that of a permanent resident at the discretion of the Attorney General and sub-
ject to the approval of Congress.
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the country from which they have fled. While the purpose is laudable,
the situation may have been a factor in the "Cold War." Recogniz-
ing the validity and merits of national commitments to an ideological
position and the laudable goals of humanitarian concern, the issue is
not so much whether the fugitive should be granted asylum and his
extradition denied on political offense grounds, but rather who he
is and how it is done. Presently, a politically important fugitive of a
state who seeks to be personally secure will seek refuge in a state
which is "politically" adverse to the demanding state. Thus, the de-
cision to request extradition by the demanding state, or that of its
granting or denial by the asylum state, is invariably going to involve
the whole spectrum of their political relations. The standard by
which the relator's conduct will be evaluated and whether he will
be extradited or granted asylum will therefore depend on the overall
political relations between the states involved., 9 The fugitive is
therefore in a position to pit one state against the other. Also, since
the issue of his extraditability is left to the decision-making process
of the asylum state (which decides in accordance to its own laws)
there is no shelter for the asylum state, which is forced to elect be-
tween its political interest and its humane concern for the refugee,4
which are possibly conflicting.
39. Appendix B is a specially prepared chart which analyzes all the treaties be-
tween the United States and those countries with which the United States has
extradition treaties. The reader will observe that the countries that are ideologically
closest to the United States are those with which there exist the greatest number of
treaties-and their type is usually significant. If the reader compares the "political
offense exception" provision in American treaties listed in Appendix A, he will
notice that treaty language is significantly different, while if one examines the
practice it differs significantly with respect to certain countries. The key to inter-
preting these differences may be found in this cumulative treaty relations chart
which warrants a special study beyond the scope of this article. Note also the
signatories to the various multilateral extradition conventions, intra note 55.
40. The choice is often politically perilous. The Chicago Sun-Times, April 3,
1969, at 12, col. 3, reported:
"lran Breaks Ties with Lebanon"
"Beirut, Lebanon-The government said Wednesday Iran broke off diplomatic
relations with Lebanon Tuesday.
"Both countries withdrew their respective ambassadors March 22, over events
relating to former Iranian security chief Gen. Taymour Bakhtiar.
"Iran wants Bakhtiar to face trial on charges of embezzlement and misuse of
power when he was chief of security.
"Bakhtiar, a cousin of former Empress Soraya, is serving a one-year prison sen-
tence here for arms smuggling. The Lebanese have refused twice to extradite
him to Iran. Both times the Lebanese said they would not extradite him be-
cause it was against tradition to extradite political refugees."
See also supra notes 5 and 16.
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In view of the precarious nature of this situation, the asylum state
has to exercise the greatest discretion and caution when granting
asylum and refusing extradition or vice versa. Thus, many states
employ subterfuge to reach this desired result extra-legally, which
is often to the detriment of the individual. This is usually done under
the cover of immigration laws which are manipulated to fit the situa-
tion. The convenience of these practices depends on the fact that
immigration questions are usually decided by an administrative au-
thority which invariably has some measure of discretion. The execu-
tive authority of the state can therefore control the practice with
some degree of certainty that little or no judicial review will oc-
cur. The object of all such devices is to keep the ultimate control
of the situation in the hands of the political branch of the government.
This is obviously not for the benefit of the individual, but to give the
political branch leeway in meeting certain situations which might
either prove politically embarrassing or, conversely, politically ad-
vantageous.
One way of allowing a refugee de facto asylum is by letting him
enter on "parole." This legal fiction signifies that the alien is allowed
physically in the country, but is not legally "admitted." If the alien
proves to be a political liability, his "parole" is administratively re-
voked (as it was granted) and no legal issues arise. If the alien had
been legally "admitted" as a visitor or resident, the question becomes
slightly more difficult. As a visitor, he is a guest at sufferance; his
visa can be revoked and he is usually asked to leave voluntarily.
The period of such "voluntary departure" status can range from
hours to days. A resident must have his residence revoked, and this
usually allows some method of internal administrative or judicial re-
view. To be rid of an alien is rather a simple matter in most coun-
tries. 1 These practices often become handy adjuncts in the hands
41. An alien in the United States has some rights with respect to due process
in exclusion cases. See Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908), noted in
66 HAiiv. L. REV. 643, 661-76 (1953), 37 MINN. L. REV. 440 (1953), 20 U. CHI. L.
REV. 547, 551 (1953), 62 YALE L.J. 1000 (1953).
In Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), noted in 34 B. U. L. REV.
85 (1954), 67 HARV. L. REV. 99 (1954), 51 MIcH. L. REV. 1231 (1953), 37 MINN.
L. REV. 453 (1953), 33 NEB. L. REV. 94 (1953), 28 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1042 (1953),
26 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 192 (1954), and 27 SO. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1954), it was
held that a twenty-five year resident who left the United States temporarily to visit
his mother could, on his return, be excluded without a hearing and confined in-
definitely on Ellis Island since no other state could be found to which he could
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of states seeking to evade extradition proceedings, and they are
labelled "disguised extradition. 42  If delivery of an alien is sought
outside the framework of extradition, neighboring states can expel
or deport the alien to their borders. If it so happens that the border
is with the state which has expressed an "interest" in the individual,
their agents will be at that border to seize him.4"
That distance is no impediment to such schemes is demonstrated
by the Soblen case, in which a fugitive was ordered deported because
he had entered England without permission. 44  Dr. Soblen was ac-
cused of espionage in the United States. Released on bond, he fled
to Israel claiming asylum and citizenship as a Jew under the Israeli
law of return. Israel, under United States pressure, found that he
did not qualify, and he was placed on an El Al flight bound for New
York. Interestingly, there were no other passengers aboard except
U.S. marshals. Close to England, Soblen attempted suicide; the plane
landed, and he was taken to a hospital. The United States wanted
Soblen, but the crime he was accused of was clearly a "political
offense"-non-extraditable under the Anglo-American treaty of
1931. , England then found that Soblen had not been "legally ad-
mitted" and ordered his departure on the first available flight of the
day, presumably to be returned to Israel. It so happened that there
were no Israel-bound flights that day-only a Pan Am flight, to
New York, upon which he was to be placed (instead, he died in an
English hospital). In so doing, the legal process of extradition was
to be evaded, while the result desired by the states involved would have
been attained. Since this type of practice requires the connivance of
the governments involved, another device is used when the state of ref-
uge is reluctant to so cooperate-outright abduction or kidnapping
be sent. For a state's responsibility toward aliens in international law, compare 4
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 95 (1901), with 5 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 et seq. (1963). See also Guha-Roy, Is the Law of Re-
sponsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal International Law?
55 Am. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961); and Spiegel, Origin and Development of Denial of
Justice, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1938).
42. O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MOD. L. REv. 521
(1964).
43. The only American case known to this author wherein a border state re-
fused to exercise jurisdiction over the person of an individual when jurisdiction was
secured by force or fraud is Dominquez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92, 234 S.W. 79
(1921).
44. See O'Higgins, supra note 42.
45. 47 Stat. 2122 (1933).
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of the individual as with Eichmann and Tshombe. 4' This is made
possible by the survival of the rule mala captus bene detentus, where-
by courts will assert in personam jurisdiction without inquiring into
the means through which the presence of the accused was secured.47
Consider that any of these strategies is extra-legal in form,
substance, or both, but there is no deterrent to them if their conse-
quences are allowed to produce legally valid results. Aside from the
flagrant violation of the individual's right, such practices violate the
lawfulness of international relations and subvert the international
process. It clearly is an infringement of the concept of the "Rule of
Law" and its consequences may range well beyond that. Consider
the threat to the relations of the nations involved if abduction is the
method of extradition as in the Eichmann and Tschombe examples,
and consider the impact of such practices on world public order as
they shake the already frail international balance and peaceful rela-
tions of interested states. 48 This is not to overlook the dangers of
shielding an alleged political offender who may not fall within
that category but who is politically valuable to the asylum state.
This is all too often the case in luring defectors from other countries,
usually ideologically and politically opposite and, thus, world tensions
and threats to its public order are intensified under the often false
premise of humanitarian concern.
46. On the Eichmann case, see Cardozo, When Extradition Fails is Abduction
the Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (1961); Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some
Legal Aspects, 1961 DUKE L. J. 400; Musmanno, The Objections in Limine to the
Eichmann Trial, 35 TEMP. L. Q. 1 (1961). On the Tshombe case see International
Commission of Jurists, Bulletin No. 32 at 28-29, Dec. 1967, and attorney Luis Kut-
ner's Petition for Writ of "World Habeas Corpus" presented to the United Nations
Human Rights Commission in July, 1967.
47. For a discussion of the principle with respect to jurisdiction in extradition
proceedings, see Bassiouni, 36 TENN. L. REV., supra note 10, at 10-12, and O'Hig-
gins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, [1960] 36 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
279. See also Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives
Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32
IND. L. J. 427 (1957); Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over a Defendant
Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MJNN. L. REV. 91 (1953); and
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), cited by numerous countries as a landmark
for the mala captus bene detentus rule. See Hunt, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM.
J. INT'L L. 678 (1953); Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case, 30 AM.
J. INT'L L. 123 (1936); Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign
Territory, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1935); Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seiz-
ure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1934).
48. See Argentina's protest against Israel for the kidnapping of Eichmann and
the Security Council's condemnation of Israel, 15 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/4349.
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The measures which are outlined above are extraordinary in the
extra-legal sense, since an ordinary, i.e., legal, process exists, and this
author would propose borrowing a Roman Law maxim to interdict
this practice: Nunquam Decurritur Ad Extraordinarium Sed Ubi
Deficit Ordinarium 9
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: THE EXCEPTION TO THE
"POLITICAL OFFENSE" EXCEPTION
Offenses against the Law of Nations or Delicti Jus Gentium by
their very nature affect the world community as a whole. 50 As such,
they cannot fall within the "political offense" exception because,
even though they may be politically connected, they are in derogation
of the laws of mankind in general and international criminal law in
particular. 5 ' To disregard such an exception to the exception would
be in itself violative of international law and disruptive of world
public order. Such offenses are specifically proscribed by interna-
tional law in restricto, which imposes upon the violator individual
responsibility; however, in extenso conduct, which is disruptive of
world public order, may also be considered violative of international
law.
The specific violations of international criminal law in restricto
include, but are not limited to, slavery, piracy at sea and in the air
or, "hijacking," offenses against the peace and security of mankind
(including aggression), war crimes, serious violations of the Geneva
Conventions, and genocide.5" Despite their possible political con-
nection, these crimes are proscribed by international law because the
49. Never resort to the extraordinary but and until what is ordinary fails.
INSTITUTES 4:84. (Translation and emphasis by author).
50. See MUELLER & WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1965); RIPOLLES,
TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL Y INTERNACIONAL PENAL (1955-57);
ST. GLASER, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PENAL (1954);
JESCHECK, DI VERANT-WORLTICHKEIT DER STAATSORGANE NACH VOLKERSTRAFRECHT:
EINE STUDIE ZU DEN NURNBERGER PROZESSEN (1952); KEENAN, CRIMES AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950); PELLA, LA CRIMINALITE COLLECTIVE DES ETATS ET EL
DROIT PENAL DE L'AVENIR (1926); and DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, supra note 28.
51. See Garcia-Mora, Crimes against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextra-
dition of Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927 (1964); Garcia-Mora, War
Crimes and the Principle of Nonextradition of Political Offenders, 9 WAYNE L.
REV. 269 (1963); Green, Political Offense, War Crimes and Extradition, 11 INT.
& COMP. L. Q. 329 (1962); Neuman, Neutral States and the Extradition of War
Criminals, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1951).
52. Since this article does not contemplate a study of international crimes in
general, a reference to them is made herein and some specific cites are offered.
On slavery, see Fischer, The Suppression of Slavery in International Law, 3 Irr.
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world community has, with respect to such crimes, an interest in pre-
serving the peace and security of mankind and in combatting this
type of criminality. These are crimes against mankind because
mankind has come to so recognize them after they became part of
the common values and the common morality of man. The issue
in such cases is no longer the opposability of extradition because of
the political connection of those crimes, but rather their ipso facto
exclusion from consideration as part of the exception because they are
part of the internationally defined offenses.
There is a difficulty, however, in determining what these offenses
are, their precise elements, and the factual establishment of their
occurrence. Conceptually, agreement is reached on the notion of
an "exception to the exception," but in fact, it will still require the
codification of international crimes. Thereafter, they can either be
adopted by municipal law, in which case states will prosecute the
offender wherever he is found, or they can remain international if
their enforcement is by an international criminal court. The efforts
of scholars, the International Law Commission of the United Na-
tions, and international organizations, are developing such pro-
L. Q. 28-51 and 503-22 (1950); Gutteridge, Supplementary Slavery Convention,
1956, 6 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 449 (1957). On crimes against the peace and security
of mankind, see PELLA, LE CODE DES CRIMES CENTRE LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE DE
L'HUMANITE (Geneva, 1951); PELLA, LA CRIMINALITE COLLECTIVE DES ETATS ET
LE DROIT DE L'AVENIR (Geneva, 1949); Johnson, The Draft Code of Of-
fences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT. AND CoMP. L. Q. 445(1955); II YEARBOOK OF I.L.C. 133-37 (1951); II YEARBOOK OF THE I.L.C. 149-52
(1954); Graven, Principes Fondamentaux d'un Code Repressif des Crimes Centre
la Paix et la Securite de 'Humanite, 28 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 173
(1950); KEENAN AND BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950); Parry,
Some Considerations upon the Content of a Draft Code of Offenses against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 3 INT. L. Q. 208 (1950); Whiteman, Plan for a
World Criminal Code, 3-4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 248 (1946).
On the Geneva Convention, see the GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 1949 (Gen-
eva, 1950); 3 U.S.T.L.Q./A. No. 3662-3665 (1955); Yingling and Ginnane, The
Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393 (1952). On genocide, see
G.A. Res. 96(i) U.N. Doc. - at - (1946); Bassiouni, The War Power and the
Law of War: Theory and Realism, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 188 (1968). On aggression
and war crimes, see STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958); POMPE, AGGRES-
SIVE WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME (1953); Roling, International Criminal Juris-
diction, 1955 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 167; Jescheck, Die Entwicklung des Volk
Erstrafrechts Nach Nurnberg, 72 S.Z.F.Str.R. 217 (1957); Baxter, The Definition of
War, 16 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 528 (1951); DROST, THE
CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE (1959); WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1960); TRIFFTERER, DOGMATISCHE UNTER-SUCHUNGEN ZUR ENT-
WICKLUNG DES MATERIALLEN VOLKUSTRAFRECHTS SEIT NURNBERG (1964). On Piracy,
see I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 609 (8th ed. 1955).
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posals. 3 Their adoption by the nations of the world is slow, but
such relentless and dedicated efforts are bound to bear results. Note,
however, that most extradition treaties make specific mention of the
exclusion of war crimes and genocide from the political offense ex-
ception. Most military and criminal codes also refer to violations of
the Laws of War as military crimes.
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze international crimes,
which are excluded from the meaning of the political offense excep-
tion to extradition. Suffice it to state that those crimes are exclud-
able even though there is much uncertainty and controversy about
them, except in the treaties between the Soviet Union and all Eastern
European countries other than Yugoslavia.
WHAT IS A "POLITICAL OFFENSE ' : THE
SEARCH FOR CRITERIA
The problem of the political offense exception arises first as a
definitional one, which usually sees fruition in a compromise clause
in a treaty. Thereafter, it becomes a matter of judicial interpretation
by the extradition magistrate, whose duty it is to interpret and apply
the provisions of the treaty. Finally, a discretionary veto is available
to the executive branch."4 Those countries which make it an ad-
ministrative rather than a judicial process have, of course, no diffi-
culty in rationalizing their decisions. All multilateral treaties exempt
"political offense" from extradition and so do the overwhelming ma-
53. The International Law Commission has made several attempts at the
codification of international crimes, but no agreement has been reached to date.
See Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of 1950, U.N. GAOR, V. Supp. 12CA; [1951] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/1858 and U.N. Doe. A/2693 (1954). Numer-
ous scholarly publications in this field include: Johnson, The Draft Code of
Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 445
(1955); Graven, Principes Fondament anx d'un Code Repressif des Crimes Contre
la Paix et la Securite de L'Humanite, 28 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 173
(1950); KEENAN AND BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950); Parry,
Some Considerations upon the Content of a Draft Code of Offenses against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 3 INT'L L. Q. 208 (1950); ST. GLASER, INFRACTIONS
INTERNATIONALES (1957); PELLA, LE CODE DES CRIMES CONTRE LA PAIX ET LA
SECURITE DE L'HUMANITE (1951); DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MOD-
ERNES DU DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL (1928); PELLA, LA CRIMINALITE COLLEC-
TIVE DES ETATS ET LE DROIT PENAL 45 L'AVENIR (1949); and TRAVERS, LE DROIT
PENAL INTERNATIONALE (1920-1922).
54. Supra note 29. For the American practice, see supra note 10. With refer-
ence to executive discretion, see Bassiouni, 36 TENN. L. REV., supra note 10, at
25-27, and Comment, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1314
(1962).
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jority of bilateral treaties. 55 The term itself, according to Oppenheim,
was unknown in international law until after the French Revolu-
tion.56 Its rise was due to the emergence of constitutionalism in the
nineteenth century, when the right to freedom and to revolt for
freedom became an active reality. Its mottos were set by the eight-
eenth century philosophers, who drew largely on the humanism of
their predecessors.
Whenever the law which was violated embodied political values
or the protection of political structures, and the actor was moved by
his commitment to differing ideological values or beliefs seeking to
affect such interests without committing a private wrong, the crime
committed was said to have been "purely political." Whenever such
crime also involved the commission of a common crime, i.e., a pri-
vate wrong, it ceased to be a purely political crime. It could then
be labelled a "relative political offense" or a common crime.5 7
A distinction must be established between moral, intellectual,
ideological, or political opposition not translated into any material
conduct, such as verbal pronouncements exhibiting dissent or dis-
agreement which do not advocate violence, and conduct which, in
addition to its political ingredients, involves the commission of com-
mon crimes. Between these extremes lies the grey area of uncer-
tainty. If the political offense is conduct which violates positive
law, but which was motivated or necessitated by the political objec-
tive, then the question is: How far can violations of positive law,
which are considered violative of municipal public order, be tolerated
and allowed to fall within the exception? There are two aspects to
this query: (1) the nature, intensity, and number of such violations;
and (2) the standard of inquiry which shall be applied to determine
55. See, e.g., The Montevideo Convention (1933), the Arab States Convention
(1952), the European Convention on Extradition (1957), the Afro-Asian Confer-
ence Countries' Convention (1961), and the Benelux Convention on Extradition
(1962), which all provide for a political offense exception.
The above conventions are cited and discussed in BEMT, ExTRADITION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE at 218-40 (1968). See also DeSchutter, International
Criminal Law in Evolution: Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Benelux Countries, 14 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 382 (1967); O'Higgins, Euro-
pean Convention on Extradition, 9 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 491 (1960); Honig, Extra-
dition by Multilateral Convention, 5 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 549 (1956); and DeFrei-
tas, A European Extradition Convention, 41 TRANS. GROTIUS Soc. 25 (1955).
56. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 704 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
57. The distinction between delits complexes and delits connexes was first made
by Billot in his TRAITE DE L'ExTRADITION 104 (1874).
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the overall nature and character of the conduct, i.e., objective or
subjective.
The tendency is usually to balance the nature and intensity of the
violation in terms of its commonly accepted social significance versus
the objective or subjective necessity of reverting to such conduct in
order to obtain the political impact desired. Implicit in such a
balancing concept is the weighing of the "urgency" and "need" fac-
tors which prompted the relator to assault the political order and the
"commensurateness" or "proportionality" of the means used by the
violator to the transgression of those values or rights which the politi-
cal offender seeks to protect or protest. This, of course, is a value-
oriented evaluation, because its factors, while allegedly objective, are
themselves value-based and value-oriented; and therein lies the tend-
ency to accept subjective standards rather than to formulate objec-
tive criteria. Notwithstanding any declaration by a nation-state of
its adherence to objective standards, such standards will not become
truly objective unless they represent the average, common, reasonable
judgment of all peoples of the world community. Any substitute
becomes a limited objective standard-one that is based on the com-
mon values of the ordinary reasonable man of the asylum state-
which allows the imposition of the common and popular ideals and
values of one nation-state upon another.
THE PURELY POLITICAL OFFENSE
Such an offense is usually conduct directed against the sovereign
or a political subdivision thereof. It constitutes a subjective threat
to a political ideology or its supporting structures without any of the
elements of a common crime. It is labelled a "crime" because the
interest sought to be protected is the sovereign. The word "sovereign"
includes the political integrity, safety, and all the intangible factors
pertaining to the functions and functionalism of a political organiza-
tion. Conduct which affects the sovereign as described is a crime in
that it violates a positive law, but a law which is designed and destined
to protect the "public interest" by making attack upon it a "public
wrong" and not a "private wrong" as in the case of "common crimes."
The sovereign is the public authority which, representing the
ideals of the people, exercises power, whether limited or unlimited,
and directs the affairs of the collectivity for the attainment of certain
1969]
aims, whether popularly shared or imposed.' 8 The authority of the
sovereign is limited only by its constitutional structure, if any, and
only with respect to the exercise of its internal authority. The justifi-
cation for laws protecting the processes and structures through which
the sovereign manifests its authority is based on the notion that the
sovereign serves the "public interest."5 9  Thus, the "public interest"
is transgressed by conduct which impedes the governmental process
or its structure and disturbs the peace, tranquility, or lawful func-
tioning of societal activity; as such it is a public wrong justifying
criminal sanctions. The substantive and procedural context of this
"public interest" concept is politico-legal and is beyond the scope of
this paper.60 One may, however, conclude that conduct directed
against the "public interest" expressed by the sovereign is a "purely
political crime."
Treason, sedition, and espionage are offenses directed against the
state itself and are, therefore, by definition a threat to national se-
curity and the well-being of the body politic. As such, they are
"purely political offenses." 6' 1 The Constitution of the United States
limits treason to levying war against the United States, adhering to
its enemies, or giving them aid and comfort.62 It further requires
that no person shall be convicted of treason unless the conviction is
based upon the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
This definition presupposes allegiance to the United States; an alien,
therefore, can never be guilty of treason, even for the commission
58. See Bassiouni, supra note 24, at 282-85.
59. See Miller, Foreword to The Public Interest Undefined, Fundamental Con-
cepts of Public Law Symposium, 19 J. PUB. L. 195-97 (1967).
60. Id. See also Sorauf, The Public Interest Reconsidered, 19 J. POL. 616-
30 (1957).
61. See Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses un-
der the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 65 (1964); and Deere, Political
Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1933).
In re DeBernonville, (1955) I.L.R. 527, holds that, "treason to country [is]
among political crimes, the authors of which are not subject to extradition". Ac-
cord, Ex parte Kolcynski, 1 Q. B. 540 (1955): "Treason is an offense of a political
character." In Chandler v. United States, it was held inter alia that political offend-
ers include persons charged with treason. 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948). In In re
Ockert, [1933-1934] Ann Dig. 369 (No. 157), it was said, "high treason, capital trea-
son and the like [are political offenses] because the offense is against the state and
its principal organs."
62. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 and 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1948). See also
Bassiouni, supra note 24, at 285-89.
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of an act which would be treason if committed by a citizen. 3
Aside from the question of the elements of treason as an offense,
the concept gives rise to a variety of confusing by-products. The
disturbing trend of proliferating treasonous offenses to encompass a
variety of forms of political opposition is increasing in almost all
countries of the world. One author noted that:
Although the Soviet formulation reflects the traditional law in regarding treason as
breach of allegiance to the State, it nevertheless goes amazingly far in lumping to-
gether treason, desertion and espionage, and, even more striking, in setting up escape
or flight abroad as a treasonable act. 64
Sedition requires only a communication intended to incite a viola-
tion of public peace with intent to subvert the established form of
government. The offense is complete upon the utterance, and there
is no necessity for any actual riot or rebellion occurring. Sedition
is an insurrectionary movement, tending toward treason, but wanting
an overt act. It disturbs and affects the stability and tranquility of the
state by means not actionable as treasonous. The distinction between
treason, sedition and inciting to riot is relative.65
Espionage is universally seen as obtaining or attempting to obtain
secrets which deal with national security or defense for the benefit
of some foreign state. Unlike treason, there is no allegiance required
on the part of the offender-no duty which must be breached. It is
predicated on the notion of "public wrong."
Treason, sedition, espionage, and dissent by speech and writings,
if they do not incite to violence, are considered "purely political of-
fenses," because they lack the essential elements of "common crimes"
in that the perpetrator of the alleged offense acts merely as an instru-
ment or agent of a political thought or movement and is motivated
by ideology and beliefs. There is no way of defining what a "purely
political crime" can be in a manner that would exhaust the imagina-
tion of lawmakers. Probably the most useful criterion which can be
offered is that: Whenever the conduct of the actor is limited to the
63. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951); Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342 (1870); Kramer v. United
States, 147 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1945); Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HAv.
L. REV. 226 (1944).
64. Garcia-Mora, supra note 61, at 74. Compare SOVIET CRIMINAL CODE arts.
63-88 (1965) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-97 (1965) and 18 U.S.C. 951-69 (1965).
See also BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 178-86 (1966).
65. For sedition in American law, see BASSIOuNI, supra note 24, at 289-91.
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disclosure of ideas by words, symbolic acts, or writings not inciting
to violence and exclusively directed against the "public interest" rep-
resented by the sovereign or manifested by any of its political sub-
divisions and not involving a private wrong or common crime, it is
a "purely political offense."6
THE RELATIVE POLITICAL OFFENSE
The term "relative political offense" is used as a counterpart to
"purely political offense." While the latter affects the "public in-
terest" and therefore causes a public wrong, the former includes the
commission of a common crime in furtherance of a political purpose.
It is also referred to as a "quasi political offense" because of the
combined political purposes and private harm committed. Judicially,
neither term is accurate; at best they are descriptive labels. The
nature of the criminal violation performed by the offender is ad-
mittedly a common crime, which, by definition, is a private wrong.
This resulting harm is not altered by the offender's peculiar reasons
or motives, whether political or otherwise. The nature of the crime
committed is, therefore, not affected by the actor's motives and
cannot accordingly be made dependent upon them. There is nothing
that makes the crime "political," but the circumstances attending
the commission of the crime and the factors and forces which may
have lead the actor to such conduct make the offense complex (delit
complex) and deserving of special consideration.6 7 Such considera-
tion will focus directly upon the offender's motives even though
theories of criminal law remove motive from the elements of criminal
offenses."' The element of intent required for all serious crimes
bears upon the state of mind of the actor at the time he committed the
66. Civil disorders in the United States, such as the riots of the sixties in major
American cities, could be considered common crimes, relative political offenses, or
purely political offenses depending upon one's ideological position. That the United
States government considers such acts common crimes is witnessed by the "Chicago
Conspiracy" trial of the seven defendants accused of such crimes during the 1968
Democratic Convention in Chicago. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 231, 232 (1968). All
states have legislation which prohibits conduct such as disturbing the peace and
arson which is used against ideological demonstrators.
67. But see Youssef Said Abu Dourrah v. Attorney General, 8 Law Rep. Pal-
estine 43 (1941): "We know of nothing in the criminal law of this country or of
England that creates a special offense called political murder." See also [1941-1942]
ANN. DiG. 331, at 332.
68. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 62.
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actus reus. As such, the mens rea does not contemplate the reason
why, the ulterior reason, or the motivating factors which brought
about this state of mind. 9 Certainly motive is relevant in proving
intent, but it is not an element of the crime and, therefore, has no
bearing on whether or not the actor's overall conduct, accompanying
mental state, and its resulting harm will be characterized a crime.
The criminality of an actor under most penal systems is determined
primarily by what he did rather than why he did it. Motive becomes
a secondary factor in all instances except where a legal defense is
available. ° One may, however, question the proposition that a
proper motive constitutes part of a legal defense to extradition for
conduct otherwise deemed criminal. Arguments with reference to
motive and other penal policies significant in any penal system are
not so in extradition, because the matter is not inter-system but intra-
system and that which is significant to a municipal penal system has
little or no bearing on inter-state relations which are affected by their
respective public manifestations and not by their respective internal
policies. There is no basis to warrant the assumption that states are
concerned with the preservation or safety of their respective penal
systems and penal policies, unless they have a mutual interest in the
maintenance of their respective political structures which they would
seek to strengthen by maintaining or reinforcing their respective in-
ternal penal policies and factors affecting their municipal public
safety.
It is a valid assumption that whenever a state does not share the
interest in maintaining the political ideology, system, or policies of
another state, that it is less likely to exhibit concern or interest in the
maintenance of the internal structures and public safety of that other
state. In this case, it is more likely to examine the motives of the
offender and find some redeeming value or merit in his conduct, if
it is deemed political, and they will refuse to extradite him. As
matters presently stand, this is tantamount to absolving the offender
from the penal consequences of his conduct which, if examined with-
out regard to his motives, would be a "common crime" under the
jurisprudence of either the state of refuge or the requesting state.
There is no uniformity in extradition law and practice as to what
69. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 51-83.
70. .See BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 84-157.
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constitutes a quasi or "relative political offense." The degree of
connection between the motivating political factor and the com-
mon crime is the subject of diverse national policies. 7 x There is little
if any international agreement as to the nature and type of connection
which is to relate the political motive to the crime. At least three
factors must be considered: (1) the degree of political involvement
of the actor in the ideology or movement on behalf of which he has
acted, his personal commitment to and belief in the "cause" (on
behalf of which he has acted), and his personal conviction that the
means (the crime) are justified or necessitated by the objectives and
purposes of the ideological or political "cause;" (2) the existence of
a "link" between the "political motive" (as expressed above in 1)
and the crime committed; and (3) the "proportionality" or com-
mensurateness of the means used (the crime and the manner in which
it was performed) and the political purpose, goal or objective to be
served. The first of these factors is wholly subjective, the second can
be evaluated objectively, and the last is sui generis.
At least one tangible element emerges in the practice of all nations
recognizing quasi-political offenses as falling within the purview of
the political offense exception-the political element must dominate
over the intent to commit the common crime in the mind of the actor
and in the apparent significance of the said common crime, subject
to the specific exclusions of given crimes according to state law and
practice. 72  An examination of some cases will highlight these ob-
servations.
The English application is quite liberal, as enunciated in 1891,
in In re Castioni.73 Theirs is a "political incidence test," which
encompasses acts connected, no matter how tenuously, to political
turmoil.
The French view is that the political nature of each act does not
depend on the existence or non-existence of political reasons, but
only on the nature of the act considered in its essence. Under a
judicial aspect, murder continues to be a crime of common order,
71. See 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 779-857 (1959) and I
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 707 (1958).
72. See Belgian Extradition Law of Oct. 1, 1833, Les Codes 693 (31st ed. 1965);
In re Fabijan, (1933-1934) ANN. DIG. 360 (156) and infra, notes 73-79.
73. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. The latest English case is ex parte Kolczynski, I Q.B.
540, noted in 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 411 (1955).
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whatever the motives may be. The Court of Appeals of Grenoble
in 1947, held, in the case of Giovanni Gatti,7 4 that the offense does
not derive its political character from the motive of the offender but
from the nature of the rights injured.
Compare that point of view with an early American case refusing
to extradite one Rudewitz to Russia in 1908. Upon refusal of the
United States Commissioner for the Northern District of Illinois to
grant extradition, the entire record of the hearing was transferred to
the Secretary of State. The Secretary informed the Ambassador of
Russia that: "In view of these facts and circumstances, the of-
fenses with which the accused is charged are clearly political in their
nature.175  Subsequently, however, the American position was pat-
terned after In re Castioni, even though Castioni preceded Rudewitz.
Professor Evans has made the following observation:
Where the fugitive was charged with homocide or with being an accessory thereto,
the political defense was sustained in those instances in which it could be shown
that the act had been committed in the course of a revolt or uprising or during a
disturbed political situation in the state of origin, that the act had a political objec-
tive or that the fugitive feared political persecution if he were extradited. But
where homocide was committed as an isolated act ...of treachery or of personal
revenge or without a logical relationship to a political objective, the plea of political
defense was rejected and extradition granted. 76
The nature of the offense is thus to be determined by the motive of
the offender, although qualified by the attending circumstances,
for while it is quite possible that the killer of a head of state feels that
his act is justified because he disagrees with the philosophy of the
power structure, that "political" motivation cannot be said to be
the controlling element in determing the nature of the offense. Even
the showing of a lack of personal vendetta may not be enough to
bring the crime within the framework of the delit complex.
In 1928, the Swiss Court in In re Pavan,7 limited the political
offense to those crimes which are invested with a predominantly
political character and only where the act is in itself an effective
means of obtaining this object or where it is an incident in a general
74. [1947] ANN. DiG. 145. See 2 LEVASSEUR, JURIS CHASSEUR DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL 405-10 (1965).
75. Letter from Secretary of State Elihu Root to Russian Ambassador Rosen,
1908, on file in Dep't of State, File no. 16649/9.
76. Evans, supra note 16, at 18.
77. [1928] ANN. DIG. 347. In the Ktir case decided by Switzerland, extradition
was granted to France in 1961.
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political struggle in which similar means are used by each side.
Generally, individual acts of assassination, terrorism, or anarchy
will not be dignified as relative political offenses, no matter how
politically motivated the perpetrator of the offense may have been.
Where there is no actual movement or political force directed toward
the overthrow of the existing government, any such offense will be
seen as a common crime. This view was espoused by the English
Court in In re Ockert,7 s in which the Court indicated that a crime
which amounted to an act of terrorism without any relation to some
particular political object would not give rise to grounds for asylum
and extradition would be granted.
Renewed attempts to define "political offense" have been the sub-
ject of several recent enactments throughout the world and attest to
the difficulty and diversity of approach and treatment to this in-
herently unruly question.79
One cannot help but be tempted to question the possible nature
of three causes cjl~bres of the late sixties in the United States: Lee
Harvey Oswald, killer of President John F. Kennedy and in turn killed
by Jack Ruby; James Earl Ray, killer of the Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr.; and Sirhan Sirhan, killer of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.
Assume Oswald had sought refuge in China, Ray in South Africa or
Rhodesia, and Sirhan in Syria. An educated guess would put the
three fugitives beyond the reach of extradition to the United States.
Assume, arguendo, the same fugitives to have respectively chosen
Ireland, Liberia and Israel; another guess is that if they survived local
passions, they would have been delivered to United States authorities
before the extradition request would have even been signed in Wash-
ington. One will probably never really know if these men acted on
their own or as executioners on behalf of a group, movement, or
78. [1933] ANN. DIG. 369.
79. For some recent foreign legislation in extradition containing an exception
to political offenses, pure and complex, including military and fiscal offenses, see
Swedish Law of Extradition of 6-12-1956; Morrocan Law of Extradition of 8-11-
1958; Spanish Law of Extradition of 26-12-1958; Ghana Law of Extradition of 15-12-
1960; Indian Law of Extradition of 15-9-1962; Sierra Leone Law of Extradition of
17-1-1963; Uganda Law of Extradition of 22-6-1964; Ireland Law of Extradition
of 19-7-1965; Algerian Law of Extradition of 8-6-1966 (in Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure); Australian Law of Extradition of 27-10-1966; Netherlands Law of Extra-
dition of 9-3-1967; and Danish Law of Extradition of 9-6-1967.
For American extradition treaties, see Appendix A. For federal statutes which
regulate extradition matters, see 18 U.S.C. § 3181 et seq. (1968).
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party. Whether moved by their own ill-conceived beliefs or as agents
of a movement, assuming their sanity, one could advance the proposi-
tion that from his vantage point each was the object of a commitment
to a "higher cause" which justified risking his own life as well as
taking that of the victim.
Most penal systems in the world have adopted a policy of grading
or dividing crimes designed to protect a given social interest into
various levels of accountability. The purposes of such policy vary,
but, in general, they signify that the criminality of an actor, being
dependent upon what he does and how he does it, must be graded in
such a manner as to have punishment fit the presupposed criminality
of the actor. It is further believed that, because punishment is a
deterrent, the multiplicity of offenses which relate to the same social
interest by virtue of such grading will induce the potential offender
to perform lesser harm whenever he engages in his intended criminal
conduct. Whatever the reasons for a grading policy, one thing re-
mains certain: too many technically different offenses cover or
relate to the same social interest presumably sought to be protected.80
In addition to these considerations, a given social harm by reason
of its significance will invariably contain lesser or included harms
which, taken independently, are the subject of separate offenses but,
in the context of what was actually done, are incorporated therein.
The ideologically motivated offender is not likely to commit a
single or isolated criminal act. Most likely his conduct will incor-
porate several lesser included offenses or bear upon other non-in-
cluded but related offenses. These multiple offenses may either
arise from a single criminal act (a bomb placed in a plane which
kills ten persons and destroys the plane will produce at least eleven
different crimes), or from the same criminal transaction (an elab-
orate Mission: Impossible-type scheme involving several different
crimes related by the single design or scheme of the actor). These
related offenses technically may be included offenses whenever the
elements of the higher degree offense are predicated on some or all
of the elements of the lesser degree offense, in which case the exist-
ence of the lesser included offense would only be technical and not
real. Other offenses deemed related but not included may be com-
80. See BASSIOVNI, supra note 24, at 126.
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mitted by the actor's design or by the necessity of his own scheme,
such as, the common crime being committed only as a stepping stone
or as a means to commit the offense really aimed at." While lesser
included offenses are vertically linked to each other, related offenses
are horizontally linked. The former type of multiple offense merges
into the greater, while the latter type does not merge and each crime
may be the subject of separate prosecution.
The determination of the relationship of all offenses committed
as part of the scheme of the "relative political offense" is, perhaps
at first,. one of motive, but further inquiry must be made into the
nature of the criminal transaction. This inquiry leads to the follow-
ing questions: (1) Were all the offenses committed part of the "same
(political) criminal transactions?" (2) What were the number and
extent of these violations? (3) How were they related in scope,
time, place and social significance? (4) To what extent did the
political scheme necessitate the commission of such multiple offenses?
(5) Could they readily be identified as legally "included offenses,"
or did they appear to be related only by the actor's design?
One interesting question which could arise at this point is: What
if this inquiry concluded only partially in favor of the relator? Shall
the extradition judge or executive authority weigh the degree of com-
pliance of the relator's conduct to these tests versus his noncompliance
and determine its outcome by a "preponderance of compliance"
test? Or shall he disqualify the relator from the benefit of the "po-
litical offense" exception because there was a single instance of non-
compliance? In this case we also see the limited chances of a juridi-
cal solution in a world system wherein the ultimate relationship be-
tween political units is predicated upon a concept of co-equal sover-
eigns exercising all-too-often conflicting, co-equal authority. Were
the alternative a vertical jurisdictional authoritative process, the issue
would then be removed from the contentious or opposing co-equal
horizontal authoritative process and some opportunities for direct
conflict would therefore be eliminated.
A PROPOSED JURIDICAL CRITERION FOR THE "POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION"
Searching for an objective standard can lead to an analogy to the
81. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 126.
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law of self-defense as commonly accepted in all penal systems, where-
in a person is justified in causing harm to another to insure his own
safety. The primary consideration in the law of self-defense is a
value-judgment based on the inherent justification of self-preserva-
tion and its overriding exonerating effect on the consequences arising
out of the potential harm to be inflicted upon the aggressor. The
means authorized, the use of force, is dependent upon the nature of
the potential harm sought to be inflicted by the aggressor on the vic-
tim and the latter's need to prevent such harm from occurring.
Hence, if fundamental human rights are seriously violated by an in-
stitutional entity or a person or persons wielding the authority of the
state and acting on its behalf without lawful means of redress or
remedy being made available, then the responsibility of the individual,
whose conduct was necessitated by the original transgression by
reason of his need to redress a continuing wrong, is justified or miti-
gated and, therefore, warrants a denial of extradition.
This right to ideological self-preservation or political self-defense
is predicated on three categories of factors: First, factors bearing
upon the nature of the "rights" involved, which were originally vio-
lated and gave rise to the right to defend them. These include: (a)
the nature of those "rights" and their sources; (b) the extent to which
those "rights" are indispensable or necessary to the survival or basic
values of the people; (c) the historical and traditional existence of
those "rights" and the degree of their availability and enjoyment by
the people; (d) the extent of the people's reliance upon them in re-
lation to their implantation in the social psychology as necessary, in-
dispensable or fundamental to the way of life; (e) the duration of
their abridgement and, if sporadic, their recurrence; (f) the poten-
tial or foreseeable voluntary termination of the transgression by the
violating body or person; and (g) the existence or reasonable avail-
ability of a local or international remedy or legal method of redress
of such wrongs. These factors, for the most part, can be ascertained
objectively and tangibly by impartial and objective inquiry into their
existence and their validity by the extradition magistrate or the execu-
tive authority in the exercise of his discretionary power to grant or
deny extradition.
Second, factors bearing upon the conduct of the nation-state
which were seriously violative of these "fundamental rights." These
1969]
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include: (a) the nature of the transgression, abridgement, violation,
termination, subversion or abolition of the "right" or "rights"
claimed; (b) the quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the vio-
lations; (c) the manner in which they were violated, the extent of the
violation, the means used to accomplish it, the duration of the viola-
tion, and the frequency of their recurrence; (d) the avowed or im-
plicit intentions of continuing these violations or their termination
within a declared or foreseeable future; (e) whether these violations
were conditioned, caused, prompted or forced by conditions of
necessity, such as natural catastrophies, disasters, war, insurrection,
or other factors affecting the physical and tangible existence or vi-
ability of the nation-state which would justify or mitigate such con-
duct; (f) any methods or means of redress, remedies or channels
open or made available to the aggrieved party or group to which the
relator belongs; (g) any repressive actions taken against those who
claimed grievance and pursued legal channels of remedy in the pre-
scribed manner or who challenged the offensive public conduct in a
manner deemed lawful by the common standards of the ordinary
times of that nation. The factors in this category also lend them-
selves to objective inquiry.
Third, assuming the existence and validity of the conditions of
the factors in the first and second categories, factors bearing upon the
conduct of the individual who violated the positive law of the state in
defense of these "Fundamental Human Rights." These include: (a)
exhaustion of all available remedies, local and international, saving
risks of repression; (b) the explicit or implicit common understanding
in the ordinary reasonable man (of the nation-state in question) that
no redress was available in the reasonably foreseeable future and that
such conduct was, if not warranted, at least, excusable (exonerating or
mitigating) because no other alternative existed; (c) whether the in-
dividual's conduct was proportionate or commensurate with the na-
ture of the right or rights violated in terms of their objective signifi-
cance in the common understanding of the ordinary reasonable man
of the nation-state wherein the conduct took place; (d) whether the
individual's conduct was related only to the original wrong in a nega-
tive or vengeful aspect or whether it was also intended to terminate it
or to affect its redress and, thus, have a positive aspect to it; (e)
whether the means used were limited to achieve these purposes and
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there was no violation committed which was not necessitated by the
attainment of such goals through the least harmful manner; (f)
whether the assumption of any risks created would fall on the indi-
vidual perpetrator, and whether the means and tactics used would
not endanger innocent persons.
This theory of ideological self-preservation is not advanced as a
means to warrant or justify lawlessness, or anarchy, but is intended
to relate an otherwise nebulous concept, which has been the subject
of nefarious political manipulations, to the sphere of a legally or
judicially manageable theory of law. While it is beyond the scope
of this paper to expose and discuss the ramifications of such a prop-
osition, this proposed theory is intended to lay a juridical framework
to what could be considered a politically motivated offense, which
would shield its perpetrator from the repressive powers of the state
against which the violation was directed.
To discern between objective and subjective standards of evaluat-
ing the nature of the relator's conduct is not only a procedural ques-
tion, but a substantive one, because it is outcome determinative of the
issue of extraditability of the relator. Such a choice by national
public policy is one which is largely determined by the overall political
outlook of the nation-state in terms of its place in the relationship be-
tween the nation-states of the world community and the ideological
political alignment of the nation-state in question. To promulgate
an objective standard, however, requires the acceptance of a decision
made in furtherance thereof and would eliminate opportunities for
conflicts.
CONCLUSION
The realization that such problems as may be caused by the
political issues inherent in extradition law are more serious in political
offense questions leads us to the need for change. To avoid the
potentially detrimental effects of such problems, one solution is to
remove the question in its entirety from the decision-making process
of the nation-states involved. This presupposes an international
organ such as the International Court of Justice or a specialized
branch thereof to have either exclusive or appellate jurisdiction over
such matters by the previous consent of all nations of the world ad-
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hering to a universal treaty-statute on extradition. 2  The more pref-
erable procedure is to grant the international judicial decision-making
organ the exclusive jurisdiction over such cases, so as to avoid any
inflammatory situations which may precede its handling of the
matter if it were to have only appellate review functions.
The problem of the "political offense," however, goes beyond that.
The definitional issue could be resolved by the treaty-statute, while
the interpretative issue could be based on certain objective criteria
designed to eliminate the high degree of subjective evaluation pres-
ently undertaken by most countries and which has lent itself to
political rationalizations and threats to world public order. The
purely political decision involving executive discretion in conceding
or denying extradition will also be eliminated by such a proposal.
The most serious question will remain that of insuring a fair trial
for the accused, and punishment which would not be cruel and
unusual. This will remain difficult if the extraditee is to be re-
turned to the jurisdiction wherein he committed the offense. The
alternative would be to have the state of asylum exercise jurisdiction
over him and prosecute him on behalf of the jurisdiction wherein the
offense took place, using the laws of the jurisdiction against which
the accused committed the alleged offense. 83  The offender could
then be alternatively confined, if the sentence is imprisonment, either
in the state where the offense was committed or in the state where
the offense was prosecuted, i.e., the state of asylum. For countries
which adhere to the strict territorial jurisdiction concept, this would
seem a radical suggestion, but for most European countries this is
already practiced in some respect.84 Even for countries like the
United States, this would present no theoretical difficulties with re-
spect to international crimes, as the theory of jurisdiction in such
cases is universal jurisdiction.
82. See supra note 9.
83. See Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tomkins Applied to Inter-
national Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L LAW 740 (1939); Sprout, Theories as to the Ap-
plicability of International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26
AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932); WRIGHT, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE MUNICIPAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1946); and Dickinson,
The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 26, 792 (1952, 1953).
84. See DeSchutter, International Criminal Law in Evolution: Mutual Assist-
ance in Criminal Matters between the Benelux Countries, 14 Netherlands Int'l L.
Rev. 382 (1967).
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Thus, we can insure punishment of the offender aut dedere aut
punire without violating his human rights and right to procedural
fairness and simultaneously avoid disruptions of world public order,
since there would be an alternative means to the pitting of two or
more nation-states against each other. Ideally, of course, the of-
fender would be tried by an international criminal court and im-
prisoned in an international institution. The international military
tribunal at Nuremberg and the Spandau prison stand as primary
examples of the feasibility of this proposal.
The attainment of world peace is dependent upon the maintenance
of rules designed to safeguard world public order and to establish
legal channels as alternatives to the violent means which prevail in
their absence. The "rule of law" is not an ideological equalizer or a
method of compromising opposing political doctrines, but a process
of ordering and channelling conflicts through legal institutions de-
signed for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in a juridical context.
It is the gradual building of needed international legal structures,
not by ideologically superimposing such structures on the nation-
states, but by creating them to serve special purposes designed to
eliminate direct confrontations having potential for disruption of
world order and world peace.
1969]
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APPENDIX A
THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE CLAUSE"
IN AMERICAN EXTRADITION TREATIES
The United States is a party to treaties (presently in force) with
eighty-three countries, all of which contain an exception clause to the
extradition of a person charged with a "crime or offense of a political
character." A comparison of American treaty provisions is very reveal-
ing of the attempt to avoid giving a definition of "political offense."
Recent efforts to provide a workable definition of the clause must be
recognized, but they are, in the final analysis, symptomatic of the prob-
lem itself.
In all fairness, one must concede that the nature of the conduct of
the relator in its ideological context is one which by its very essence
defies definition in the classical sense of criminal law in an ideologically
divided and politically embattled world. The search for a treaty proviso
will, therefore, almost always be broad and flexible, so as to be ultimately
"politically manageable."
The definitional problem is the product of negotiations in a spirit of
cooperation between governmental representatives who seek to bind their
country to a treaty bearing essentially on judicial assistance in penal
matters. The interpretation by the magistrate is often made in a less
amiable context. The executive discretionary power, which is exercised
thereafter, finds itself confronted by political issues which are all too
often removed from the juridical merits of the issue.
A comparative grouping of American extradition treaty provisions
follows, demonstrating clearly the vagueness of the purported definition
of "political offense" and also clearly revealing its "political manageabil-
ity." Citations for the treaties will be found in Appendix B.
The treaties with Albania (1933), Equador (1872), Hungary (1856),
Indonesia (1887), Italy (1868), Monaco (par. 1, 1939), the Nether-
lands (1887), and the United Arab Republic (deemed binding on the
UAR, formerly Egypt, 1874) state:
The provisions of this treaty shall not apply to any crime or offense of a political
character, and the person or persons delivered up for the crimes enumerated in the
preceding article shall in no case be tried for any ordinary crime, committed previ-
ously to that for which his or their surrender is asked.
This provision merely declares the right to refuse extradition for what
it fails to define.
The treaties with Belgium (1901), Guatemala (1903), Haiti (1904),
Luxembourg (1883), Mexico (1903), Nicaragua (1905), Poland (1927),
San Marino (1906), and Turkey (1923) state:
The provisions of this Convention shall not be applicable to persons guilty of any
political crime or offense or of one connected with such a crime or offense. A
person who has been surrendered on account of one of the common crimes or
offenses mentioned in article . . . . shall consequently in no case be prosecuted
and punished in the State to which his extradition has been granted on account of
a political crime or offense committed by him previously to his extradition or on
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account of an act connected with such a political crime or offense, unless he has
been at liberty to leave the country for one month after having suffered his
punishment or having been pardoned.
While the words political crime or offense are often repeated, neither one
is defined or given a meaning. The following exception which appears
in the same treaty provisions is explicit in that it excludes certain acts
from the undefined meaning of "political offense":
An attempt against the life of the head of a foreign government or against that
of any member of his family, when such attempt comprises the act either of murder
or assassination or of poisoning, shall not be considered a political offense or an
act connected with such an offense.
The treaties with Colombia (1886) and Japan (1886) state:
If it be made to appear that extradition is sought with a view to try or punish the
person demanded for an offense of a political character, surrender shall not take
place; nor shall any person surrendered be tried or punished for any political offense
committed previously to his extradition, or for any offense other than that in
respect of which the extradition is granted.
The clause:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the crime or offense in respect
of which his surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or if he proves
that the requisition for his surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try
or punish him for a crime or offense in respect of which his surrender is demanded
is one of a political character, or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender
has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for a crime or offense
of a political character
is in the treaties with Australia (1931)*, Bolivia (1900), Burma (1931)*,
Canada (1842), Ceylon (1931)*, Chile (1900), Congo (Brazzaville,
1901), Cuba (1904), Cyprus (1931)*, Denmark (1902), France
(1909), Ghana (1931)*, Guyana (1931)*, Iceland (1902), India(1931)*, Ireland (1889), Kenya (1931)*, Lesotho. (1934), Malawi
(1931)*, Malaysia (1931)*, Malta (1931)*, New Zealand (1889),
Nigeria (1931)*, Norway (1893), Pakistan (1931)*, Panama (1904),
Sierra Leone (1931)*, Singapore (1931)*, South Africa (1947), Tan-
zania (1931)*, Trinidad and Tobago (1931)*, United Kingdom (1931)
and Zambia (1931)*.
The treaty with Argentina (1896) states that:
Extradition shall not be granted for a crime or offense of a political character
nor for those connected therewith.
No person delivered up in virtue of this treaty can be tried or punished for a
political crime or offense, nor for any act having connection therewith, committed
before the extradition or surrender of such person.
*Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom (1931) later adopted by the
country upon receiving its independence.
In case of doubt with relation to the present article, the decision of the judicial
authorities of the country to which the demand is directed shall be final.
Another provision is:
The provisions of the present treaty shall not import a claim of extradition for
any offense of a political character, nor for acts connected with such offenses; and
no person surrendered by or to either of the parties in this treaty shall be tried or
punished for a crime or offense.
The State applied to or the courts of that State shall decide whether the offense
is of a political character or not.
When the offense charged comprises the act of either murder or assassination or
of poisoning, either consummated or attempted, the fact that the offense was
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attempted or committed against the Sovereign or Head of any State or against the
life of any member of his family, shall not be deemed sufficient to sustain that
such offense was of a political character; or was an act connected with offenses
of a political character.
This language is found in the treaties with Austria (1930), Bulgaria
(1924), Costa Rica (p. 1, 1922), Cuba (p. 3, 1904), Czechoslovakia
(1925), Denmark (p. 3, 1902), Dominican Republic (1909), El Salvador
(1911), Estonia (1923), Finland (1924), Germany (Federal Republic,
1930), Greece (1931), Honduras (1909), Iceland (p. 3, 1902), Iraq
(1934), Latvia (1923), Liberia (1937), Liechtenstein (1936), Lithuania
(1924), Paraguay (1913), Portugal (1908), Romania (1924), Spain
(1904), Thailand (1922), and Venezuela (1922). Excepting assassina-
tions, no further definition or meaning is given to what is the "political
offense."
The search for some objective criteria and for a semblance of a defini-
tion, even though stated negatively, appears in the treaties with Brazil,
Israel, and Sweden. The treaty with Brazil (1964) states:
When the crime or offense for which the person's extradition is requested is of
a political character, he shall not be extradited. Nevertheless:
1. The allegation by the person sought of a political purpose or motive for the
request for his extradition will not preclude that person's surrender if the crime
or offense for which his extradition is requested is primarily an infraction of the
ordinary penal law. In such case, the delivery of the person being extradited will
be dependent on an undertaking on the part of the requesting state that the political
purpose or motive will not contribute toward making the penalty more severe.
2. Criminal acts which constitute clear manifestation of anarchism or envisage
the overthrow of the basis of all political organizations will not be classed as
political crimes or offenses.
3. The determination of the character of the crime or offense will fall exclusively
to the authorities of the requested state.
When the crime or offense for which the person's extradition is requested is purely
military, extradition will not lie.
The treaty with Israel (1963) states:
Extradition shall not be granted when the offense is regarded by the requested
State as one of a political character or if the person sought proves that the request
for his extradition has, in fact, been made with the view to trying him or punishing
him for an offense of a political character.
The treaty with Sweden (1961) states:
Extradition shall not be granted:
1. When the offense is purely military.
2. If the offense is regarded by the requested States as a political offense or
as an offense connected with a political offense.
The treaty with Uruguay (1905) states that:
A person whose surrender has been granted shall not in any case be either prose-
cuted or punished for any political crime or act connected therewith, committed
previous to the extradition.
It should be noted that military, fiscal and economic offenses are not
usually part of the meaning of the political offense in American treaties.
The general rule is not to consider them extraditable offenses unless, of
course, they are listed in the treaty as an extraditable offense, which is
almost never the case. This, of course, raises serious questions in relations
with Socialist nations where economic, fiscal and military crimes may be
as seriously punishable as offenses against the person, if not more.
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Having thus stated the technical language of the definitional problem,
which has revealed only one thing-that no definition is provided, the
most revealing study of its intended content and meaning appears in the
political relationship between the United States and the other countries
of the world with which it has other treaties. The cumulative treaties
chart in Appendix B shows all the treaties which exist between the United
States and those countries with which it has extradition treaties (including
the political offense exception clause). The closer the countries are
ideologically, the more bound they are by a variety of treaty relations and
the more likely it is that their mutual interests will be in the respective
maintenance of their political values and systems.




































































































Nov. 14, 1933 3
Jul. 2, 1900 3
Sep. 5, 1934 .3
Dec. 25, 1964 4
Jun. 22, 1902 6
Dec. 17, 1964 5
Jun. 24, 1924 3
Aug. 9, 1842 3
Jun. 26, 1902 4
Jan. 11, 1891 5
Apr. 27, 1923 3
Mar. 2, 1905 6
Mar. 29, 1926 3
Mar. 16, 1902 6
Aug. 2, 1910 3
Nov. 12, 1873 3
Jul. 10, 1911 3
Nov. 15, 1924 3
Mar. 23, 1925 3
Jul. 27, 1911 6
Apr. 26, 1931 4
Aug. 4, 1932 6
Nov. 1, 1932 3
Aug. 15, 1903 4
Jun. 28, 1905 7
Jul. 10, 1912 3
Dec. 13, 1856 3
Apr. 23, 1936 3
Mar. 11, 1890 2
Dec. 5, 1963 6
Sep. 17, 1868 3
Nov. 26, 1886 4
Mar. 1, 1924 3
Nov. 21, 1939 3
Jun. 28, 1937 3
Aug. 23, 1924 3
Aug. 13, 1884 3
Aug. 22, 1899 3
Feb. 28, 1940 4
Jul. 11, 1889 3
Jul. 14, 1907 3
Dec. 8, 1893 6
May 8, 1905 6
Jan. 17, 1914 3
Jan. 23, 1901 6
Jun. 6, 1929 3
Nov. 14, 1908 3




























Apr. 7, 1925 3
Jul. 3, 1908 3
Apr. 30, 1951 6
Apr. 6, 1908 3
Oct. 24, 1961 9
Mar. 29, 1901 7
Mar. 24, 1924 3
Aug. 18, 1934 3
Apr. 25, 1875 3
Jun. 4, 1908 3
Apr. 14, 1923 3
Jun. 12, 1902 6
The following countries have adopted and ratified in full the treaty
with the United Kingdom (47 Stat. 2122): Australia, Burma, Ceylon,
Cyprus, Ghana, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Ma-
laysia, Malta, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Tanzania, Trini-
dad & Tobago and Zambia.
Canada and New Zealand have the same treaty as Ireland (26 Stat.
1508) and Indonesia adopted and ratified the Netherlands Treaty (26
Stat. 1481).
*Supplementary Treaty signed at a later date.
**Protocol signed at a later date.
***Additional countries covered by Treaty.
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